Ikenomic Insights

 (Piece originally published at Forbes ) U.S. policymakers portray the United States as the most open, transparent, rules-based economy in the world. Such moral preening is meant to excuse Washington's protectionism as exceptional and virtuous – trade restrictions imposed reluctantly and merely to level a proverbial playing field made unlevel by the actions of rule-breaking foreign companies and governments. But there is nothing virtuous about the biased , often capricious , and increasingly lawless administration of America’s so-called “unfair trade” laws. Facially, U.S. antidumping (AD) and countervailing duty (CVD) laws allow U.S. industries to seek and obtain special tariffs on imports determined to be sold at prices that cause or threaten to cause them injury. The laws are presumed to guard against foreign companies selling products at artificially low prices in order to knock out their American competition and establish dominance in the U.S. market. In reality, these laws ar

  (Originally published on Forbes.com) No single country in the world attracts more foreign direct investment than the United States. And no country’s businesses have invested more in the United States than Japan’s. That should be cause for celebration and flute-clinking in Washington this week, where President Biden is hosting Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. But Biden’s opposition to Nippon Steel’s proposed acquisition of U.S. Steel has rendered discussion of cross-border investment a bit uncomfortable. Rather than reiterate why Biden’s position is bad for the economy, bad for bilateral relations, bad for U.S. soft power, and bad for the administration’s whole “friendshoring” thing, this piece will toast some of the good things about the bilateral investment relationship that probably won’t make it into the official record. Let’s start with some statistics . The value of the stock of foreign direct investment in the United States (on a historical cost basis as of the end of 202

The Department of Commerce published regulations  yesterday that will expand and strengthen its enforcement of the U.S. Antidumping (AD) and Countervailing Duty (CVD) Laws. I’ve been following the trade remedy laws long enough to have no reason to expect regulatory changes that produce greater balance and objectivity to their administration at the DOC, but that doesn’t mean blatant power grabs, such as the ones codified in these new rules, shouldn’t be called out for aggrandizing the administrative state and reminding us once again that the executive branch, not Congress, continues to makes trade policy by fiat . In these new regulations, DOC is – among many other things – asserting authority under the Antidumping Law and the Countervailing Duty Law to render judgment about whether different norms, practices, rules, regulations, laws, and enforcement standards in a foreign country constitute a cost of production advantage for their manufacturers and, if so, to measure the value of th

(Originally published on Forbes.com ) A fter seven years and no end in sight to America-First trade policies, the United States – that once indispensable proponent of free trade and economic globalization – has become enamored of protectionism. Many attending the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference in Abu Dhabi this week and hoping to restore faith in the trading system have come to see the United States as a sort of international trade pariah. Although that designation may be considered a badge of honor to America’s trade skeptics, the restrictions they advocate to “protect” U.S. producers and workers claim far more U.S. companies and workers as victims. They also give cover to corporate America’s abuse of the trade laws, which includes running roughshod over pesky competitors, like small mom and pop businesses. Consider the details of a pending effort to shut imported paper bags out of the U.S. market. Apollo Global Management Inc. is a big private equity firm which purch

(Originally published on Forbes.com ) November will be heavy on pronouncements, commitments, reassurances, and the unveiling of new initiatives among countries in the Indo-Pacific region. Ground zero for this month’s activities is San Francisco, where the United States will host the annual summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and its multitude of related ministerial meetings, stakeholder convenings, and sideline huddles. The plates of governments, businesses, and NGOs are full, as the region grapples with many pressing challenges. Deftly navigating the strategic rivalry between the United States and China is one such challenge, so the possibility of warming relations resulting from a long-awaited meeting between Presidents Biden and Xi in San Francisco is welcome news to most of APEC’s 21 members. But of concrete importance to the goal of insulating regional economies from potential geopolitical fallout is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) negotiations, cert

  (Originally published on Forbes.com ) In recent years, the focus of U.S. economic and trade policy has shifted from opening markets to promoting economic security. That is an emphasis of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework agreement, the Biden administration’s signature regional economics-oriented initiative, which is expected to be substantially concluded next month. After decades of businesses and consumers enjoying the fruits of commerce with China while Washington paid too little heed to Beijing’s trade transgressions or the implications of China’s rise, prudence is overdue. Security should be prioritized. But security is not a substitute for market opening. Security and trade are complementary and reinforcing. While the Biden administration’s promotion of supply chain resiliency, friend-shoring, and other efforts to ensure the vitality of strategic industries may have merit, its reluctance to pursue market opening trade agreements does not. From the administrations of Franklin R

(Originally published on Forbes.com ) In March 2018, then-President Donald Trump  invoked his powers  under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to restrict most imports of steel and aluminum on dubious national security grounds. Last month, citing Russia’s “unjustified, unprovoked, unyielding, and unconscionable war against Ukraine” and the Russian aluminum industry’s alleged role in the war effort, President Biden amended Trump’s five-year old order with  an official proclamation  increasing tariffs to 200% on aluminum and derivative aluminum products from Russia, which just went into effect on Friday. As with most of the many sanctions imposed on Russia since its invasion of Ukraine, the expectation is that the tariff increase will help deprive Moscow of the wherewithal to continue its aggressions. That’s a worthy objective, indeed. But inching toward that outcome by restricting trade in aluminum is a path certain to generate far greater economic costs, foment discord with